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IN THE SUPREME COUR'T
of the

STATE OF UTAH
FRAN!{ BILL TOni,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs.-

Case No. 10241

DAYS OF '±7,
DcfcJz,dctnt-AppcllaJtt.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATE~IEXT

OF l(IXD OF CASE
Plaintiff while \\Tatching a rodeo sponsored by Defendant fell fro1n or ''Tas thro\vn from bleacher to concrete abut1nent on the ground below, fracturing skull,
w·hen Brahma bull charged through fence in front of
bleacher \vheTe Plaintiff sat.
DISPO,SITIOX IN L,O\VER COURT
Jury verdict of $18,548.80.
RELIEF SOlTGIIT ON
Affirmance.

APP}~_AL

STATE1\1EN'T 011., F AC TS
1

On July 21, 1962, Plaintiff, age 38, at time of trial
(R. 183), his wife, and seven (R-174) of their eight chil-
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dren drove from Centerville,. utah, \Vhere they \Yorked
in sugar beets, to Salt L·ake City, shopped around (R175), learned of the rodeo at the bus station (R·-79) and
went to the State Fair Grounds after the rodeo had begun
(R-115 and R-86, Line 5) ; ''It \\ras kind of late" (Larry
Bill·T·om, R-86); "It was kind of late and that's \vhy tlHlY
didn't have no open." (R-185, Frank Bill Ton1, Plaintiff);

Q. And the show was partly over \vhen you got
there~

.A.. Yes, sir.
Q. You didn't see the \\rholc sh0\\r ~ Is that
A. Yes, sir. (R-106, Larry Bill Tom).

right~

No ticket was paid; apparently I) laintiff offered to
pay but was invited in;
Now, you did not buy a ticket to go into the
rodeo, did you~
A. No.
Q. Had the ticket office closed when you got
Q.

there~

A.

They wasn't ,closed but I told them I was going to do that and he told me to go and bring
my family in. iThen I went out and bring
them in. (R-193, Frank Bill Tom, Plaintiff)

Plaintiff, according to his testimony, drove into town
without drinking (R-184) ; drank nothing in Salt Lake
City ·(R-185) ; according to Larry Bill T'om there 'vas no
liquor in the car (R-79), none was taken to the rodeo
grounds (R-79') and Plaintiff ''had not had anything to
drink before he went in the rodeo" (R-79); nothing 'vas
bought at the rodeo (R-86 and 87); according to Alice
Tom no liquor was consumed en route (R-174), none
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\Vhile shopping and while at fairgrounds (R-175), none
\ras in the car (R-175). Plaintiff, according to Dr.
\V right, \vho exarnined Plaintiff approximately 11 :45
(R-220), shortly after the end of the rodeo, the Brah1na
'bull event being the last itern on the progran1 (R.-2GG),
had no odor of alcohol about him ( R-205), although the
doctor customarily (R-299) looked for evidence of drinking or of intoxication. A police1nan at the tirne of the
grand entry ( l~-2-:1:7), that is, at the beginning of the
rodeo, and three hours before the injury (R--:~35) ohsci·v '-·d tr,.~o adult Indians vvith Plaintiff, "'in their forties"
(li.-:~3:2) carrying beer into the fairgrounds-obviously
uiifci·ent Indians since Plaintiff carne late:

Q. In other vvords, \Vere the ticket booths all
closed up and they vveren't selling tickets any
more!
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the show was partly over when they got
there~

A. Yes, sir.
Q. You didn't see the whole show~ Is that right~
A. Yes, sir. (R-106)

Defendant's witness, l\1acey (R-1-±5) could smell alcohol, but there were "beer cans and whiskey bottl(~~" ( l{131) all around where P1aintiff lay unconscious ai'tcr his
InJury.
Plaintiff, his son Larry, and son ·Clarence (1~-82)
sat on the top row of the bleacher \Vith l_)laintiff's wife and
two children (R-81) seated on the fourth row (R-82) about
t\vo rows removed (R-176) in front of Plaintiff (Exhibit
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B-2), while the two remaining children re1naincd asleep
in the automobile (R-92).
A half hour or so (R·-87), thereafter, a onv-ton
Brahma bull (R-131) \vas teased by perfor1ners (R-87)
''and they took tubes to that Brah1na, and he got 1nad
and came towards us ... " (Larry Bill To1n) ; ~· ... and it
took him about four times to put hiin back in the rorl·al
and came back out and started chasing hi1n around 'vith
the innertube. :That's what 1nade the bull get mad and
went through the fence." (R-178, Alice rl,o1n) ; the bull,
enraged, (R-87 and 177) charged through the fence (R114); ·under it according to :1Iacey (R-133), Defendant's
witness called to testify by Plaintifi; b._t,veen the cables
and top rail according to \V"hit,~sides (R-281); between
the rail and the cables above the top rail according to
Rudd (R-265) ; and according to Lar1·y 1J,o1n (lt-88) between the rail and the wire; at any rate, the bull negotiated the fence successfully (R-130) and got to ''within a
foot and a half or couple of feet of w·here the spectators
were sitting on the bleachers" (R-114, Macey, Defendant's
witness); and according to Alice Tom (R-189) "'right into
the crowd."
The bull was then, not Honto the track" as Defendant's brief, page 2, indicates, but in the spectators' department.
~''The bull got through the fence and charged

towards the crowd and got approximately to the
crowd and reared back, stopped, looked at the
crowd, looked to the east, looked to the 'vest, and
took off to the west." (R-144, Macey)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

The specta.tors-

...

"They did scatter. They jumped up and pushed to the east and the vvest because there is openings in that area." (R-145, Macey)
~

The spectators ~v.ere
..;.
.J,

"Stumbling ·over each other"
Tom);

(R-178), Alic~

"Everyone just ju1np off the bleachers and
there was no one left there." (R-189, Alice To1n);
"They got seared. Everybody vvas scared and
they just started to run ... " (R-195, Frank Bill
Tom, Plaintiff) ;

Q. When you ju1nped off vvhat was the situation
as far as the people in front of you and your
family~

. A..

They \Vt~re standing up and shouting. ( TI -S9,
Larry Bill Tom)

Naturally the spe-ctators

st~mpeded.

Larry Tom, sitting with Plaintiff on the top seat
(there was no back rail, R-84),-jumpe·d off (R-87). Plaintiff from behind his wife and children told her to leave
(R-178 and R-181). She and the children jumped off
(R-181). "They (the children) were the first ones off."
(R-181, Alice Tom)
Plaintiff heard his wife call "What shall we do·~" (R186). He answered: "Go on. Get up. I)1:1 going to try to
grab" and I grabbed. That's all I re1ne1nber. It throwed
Ine of.I, I guess." Plaintiff was ·'thtowed off" or fell off,
o1· \vas knocked off the bleacher. Plaintiff was "sitting
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there" as Larry jumped (R-89). Larry jumped and ran.
but turned around (R-87). "There was n1y father laying
on the ground" behind the stand (Exhibit P-2) Plaintiff
having gone off in the same direction Larry went off (R90). Plaintiff's head struck concrete (Exhibit P-10) (R98) and he was bleeding from the ear (R-98) and unconscious when L~arry turned, and when his wife, who also
jumped from the bleacher, then saw hlln lying unconscious
(R-178).
Defendant's brief, page 3, reads: "1-Ie believed that
he was thro-vvn by the bull over the grandstand (R-186 and
R-196)." Language difficulties taken in a light most
favoring levity, R-186, R-196, and elsewhere, yield no such
ludiocrisy.
Plaintiff regained consciousness in the hospital and
his last 1ne1nory is of trying to grab the rope (R-186)
and to protect his family (R-187), and he did not remember the instant of falling. Blotting out of memory of the
moments before an accident causing skull fracture and unconsciousness is "usually the case" (R-212, Dr. Wright),
and s·uch an injury can cause "hallucinations in which
a person may think he remembers certain things \vhich
never did occur." (R-230, Dr. vVright)
Plaintiff always maintained that he tried to grab the
rope (R-186) and on cross-exarnination (R-198) ruls\vcred:

Q. And you do reme1nber grabbing the

rope~

A. Yes.
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Other vvitnesses 1naintained the rope (there were four
ropes on the bull, R-87, Larry Bill Tom) was not actually
grabbed by Plaintiff.
vVithout question, the Plaintiff fell or 'vas thro,vn off
the bleachers simultaneously with the bull stampeding
the cro,vd, and according to Plaintiff because of itA.

My wife, she called rne. "vVhat shall 've do~"
she said.
"Go on. Get up. I'm going to try to grab."
And I grabbed. That's all I ren1ember. It
throwed me off, I guess.

Q.

vVhat "rere you trying to do, l\fr. Torn?

A.

Tried to grab that rope. I grabbed the rope
and I guess it 'vent up .. That thing throvved
me off.

Q. And why vvere you trying to grab the

rope~

A. Because ·my kids was running in this direction
where the bull was.

Q. Do you .remember falling at all~
A. No, I don't remember nothing after. That's
all I remember now.

Q. Where was the bull when you were trying to
grab the rope~
A.

Going past. Everybody was just scared and
running and I just grabbed that ropP to put it
on one of the seats.

Q. Now when you woke up, ~Ir. Tom, where were
you~

A. I was in the rospital.

(R-116, 117, Plaintiff)
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The jury in response to the question: "Did Fran:~
Bill Tom fall from the bleacher because of the charge
of the bull and resulting movement of the cro,vd ~" ansvvered "Yes," all eight jurors signing.
The fence was inadequate according to the fence
expert, l\1cLaughlin (R-160), and this for several reasons:
1.

Brittle cast iron eye tops, now discontinued,
v1ere used to fasten the top rail to the posts
(R-87).

2.

The eye tops were already broken, old breaks
indicated by the rust (R-137); therefore, the
eye tops could serve little purpose. (Exhibit
P -12, the broken eye tops). (Exhibits 5, 6, 8,
9, photos taken the ).1onday after the accident). (R-153)

Q. And if broken in place on the posts would
that hold the rail in place~
A.

3.

Well, the rail could stay there, yes, but
if it was hit it would fly off. (R-158,
McLaughlin)

The fence was without tension wire at the
bottom (R-158) used, according to McLaughlin, "to keep the bottom of the· fence tight
because chain link fence is flexible. (R-158)
and
"Well, the botton1 is too ~lexible, and any
force that hit it ''Tould cause the 'vire to
give at the point of i1npact, and hold up
so that whatever hit it could pass underneath it or it could go up between the top
rail and the "·ire if it \\Tasn't adeqnatPly
fastened to the top rail." (R-160, ~fc
Laughlin)
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~facey, Defendant's \\~itness, testified that the bull

.,yent under the fence (R-133); Larry Bill To1n that it \vent
bet\veen the rail and the net "Tire (R-88).

-±.

The chain link fencing \Vas tied to the top
rail with 11-gauge vvire, which-

Q.

\\T ould there be any use of having 9-gauge

fence if you tied it \vith 11-gauge \Vire ·~
A.

5.

\Vell, it "Tas not too practical, especially
\vith the fence on that side where the
pressure \\~ould be.

The chain link fence or net "~ire \v·as on the
vvrong side of the post, that is, on the spectators' side (R-161).
side~

Q.

Why is it on the vvrong

~~.

\\Tc·ll, if it Y~Tas hjt and tied like it js \vith
an animal from this side or anything else
it would have a tendency to go through.

Q. What if it had been hit-that is, if the
net wire had been on the arena side, vvhat
then~

A.

G.

Well, this way it would stretch the wire
but it wollld'nt give quite as easily as it
would on the other side because it could.n't pop the ties, you see. (R-161, 162,
Macy)

An eye-high rail was not in plaeP (R--88, J.J'ar;·~·
Bill '11om) the night of the accidPnt, though
a 2 x 6 was placed the next morning after the
bull went through the arena (R-289, 88); and
such a rail is a c,__1stomary item on livestock
fences (R-162, McLaughlin) and according
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to Willian1 S. Young, for t\venty years a rod .. o
operator (R-1G6, such an obstruction is customaryA.

Most generally the committee where 've
go to the town has paper or a board 1 x 6,
2 x 6, 2 x 8 around so that the animal when
he bucks up to the fence has something
to see.

Q.

Now has this been true during the twenty
years that you have been in the business~
Yes, sir, always.

A.

Q.

Have you observed whether or not this
board which is a visual obstruction keep
the Brahma a'vay fron1 the fence generally speaking~

A. Yes, sir. (R-168 and 169)
This bull weighed a ton (R-131), had eighteen-inch
horns (R-264), had tried to break out earlier (R-131).
Brahma bulls for rodeo eXhibition ·are normally trained
to become belligerent (R-165) ; the use generally made
is to "get them to fighting" (R-166) and "the meaner you
get them the more spectacular it is to the crowd." (R-167,
WilliamS. Young); they are "handled cautiously even at
the home ranch" (R-167) and "when "~e take them out to
a rodeo, why, we expect then1 to perform," ...

Q.

When they perfor1n they actually chase people
and try to hook the1n or run the1n down. Is
that right~

A.

Yes, sir. (R.

1~67,

Willia1n S. Young)

Plaintiff was beneath the bleacher unconscious, bleeding fron1 the ear (R-99, R-1'78) ; ""as taken by runbulanee
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to the hospital where he was seen that night by Dr.
\V right, a neuro-surgeon (R . 202), who noted that I) laintiff vvas losing blood and spinal fluid from the right ear
(R-203) and that Plaintiff had suffered "a severe skull
fracture \vhich had broke'n the bone and torn the tissue
all the \vay do\vn into the 1niddle ear and let the blood
and spinal fluid lea:~ out through that fracture and those
teal's."; and the doctor \vrote do\vn his impressions at the
tin1~~~ as being "that there vvas a skull fracture, a brain
injury, and then the various abrasions and bruises that
I have nrentioned." (R-204)
r·laintiff \VaS hospitalized 17 days, treated to prevent
1nenengitis and to control vo1niting. He \Vas partially
con0cious some 24 hours after he vvas first seen (R-206),
and i1i the next fe\v days becarne n1ore coherent and talked
coherently three days after the accident. He in1proved,
compfained of dizziness (R~2b6), and the doctor noted
''heating essentially absent in the right ear," and the
doctor concluded that "'this was most probably a re·st1lt
of' the injury which had· fractured the skull iri the area
that let spinal fluid leak out through the right ear because it is that area of the skull that houses the nerve
\vith which you hear on the right side." (R-207)
Plaintiff was taken by his family to Gallup (R-94)
and seen by D'r. Wright November 5, 1963, son1e 15 Inonths
later, and complained " . . . that he was unable to hear
on the right side in the right ear. 1-le coinplained of dizziness which was periodic and which occurred chiefly when
he was tired. He claimed that he was· rather tired all of
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the time ~nd thought that he \Yas losing weight. He hrJ
periodic pain over the upper part of the spine at the back
of the chest and also in the lower part of the spine of the
neck." (R-208, Dr. Wright) Hearing loss in the right ear
\Vas confirmed \vith a tuning fork (R-209) and he was
still disabled :

Q.

Was he in your opinion able at that time to
resume the type of work that farm labor
would do~
A. I suppose he could have returned to it, hut
I doubt that he would have been much of a
\Vorker.
Q. What would have prevented him from being
a worker~
A. Well, his weakness and his general condition
and his complaining of being tired and losing
\Veight. (R-209, 210)
To1n was next seen by the doctor May 22, 1964; he
believed his memory was poor (R-210), that his hearing
on the right side was unchanged (R-10), that he was still
weak (R-210); and even though the Plaintiff sustained
another injury, after the November examination, the
doctor in May, 1964, concluded that his diagnosis was unchanged (R-211), that Plaintiff had suffered a brain
injury (R-213. and R-218), that he "'"as pern1anently disabled as a result of the injury (R-213), that the loss of
hearing was probably pern1anent ( R-214), that the long
period of unconsciousness "~as compatible \vith the diagnosis (R-206), that his memory i1npair1nent \vas probably
permanent (R-213) and that this "'"as consistent \vith this
type of injllry to the brain (R-213).
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Dr. Haight, an ear doctor, determined that Plaintiff
:l~a.d a 30% hearing loss on the right and a 50% loss on
the left (R-232), that the patient related the hearing dif.ficulty dated fro In the fairgrounds accident ( R-232 and
ll-:2.3G) Hby his state1nent that he had no hearing loss
previous, and in our atteinpt to evaluate these things ,,~e
1nu~t take the history into consideration." (R-236)

Q. . . . Is a hearing loss that is due to nerve
i1npairn1ent of so1ne kind, is that a kind of
loss \vhich 1nay result fro1n a skull fracture ?
1\..

It's difficult to ans,ver that directly; ho,vever,
I will put it this vvay: \vith a skull fracture
if yon have bleeding into the inner ear then
you probaby vvill have a hearing loss to son1e
degree in every instance. (R-263)

A.

If there were a fracture sufficient to cause
loss of spinal fluid and blood from the ear,
I would anticipate· the:re would always be a
hearing loss.· (R-237)

And-

Dr. Haight concluded that the blow on the head could
cause a hearing injury to the· opposite ear (R-23S'), although spinal fluid drainge was from the right ear.
Before the accident Plaintiff's hearing was, ap1'a.ently, good (R-103, L·arry Bill Tom) ; I)1aintiff's hearing was good from both ears prior to the accident (R187 and 188); hearing was bad ever since the accident in
question (R-242); and was unafiucted by the January,
1964, accident (R-242).
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_Plaintiff was asked about his rnen1ory problems and
also denied that the same were connected to the January
subsequent accident. ·He said:

Q.

Now, have you observed whether or not you
can hear normally out of your right ear since
then~

A. Not so good.
Q. Has that been in any way affected by this
affray in January of 19·64, last-just last
January~ Did that affect your hearing~
:A.· No. That was since that first time.
Q. Now, l\lr. Tom, I think you told Doctor Wright
that you were having memory problems. You
weren't able to remember 1
A. No. Now I said the same thing, san1e way. I
don't remember anything.
Plaintiff suffered permanent loss of earning capacity. Prior to the 2.Jcident he did plowing, irrigating,
etc., while his childre11 thinned and weeded beets (R-189);
his over-all health was good (R-102·, line 9') but after
the accident he was not-able to do the work (R-189). The
reason was "My head was hurting. I was dizzy." (R-190,
Frank Bill ·rom, Plaintiff), and this disability was
present not only after the subsequent incident or injury,
made much of by D·efendant, Defendant's Brief, Page 5,
l1ut the following spring, i.e., spring of 1963, before the
subsequent accident, when the fru11ily \vent to Blackfoot,
Idaho to work"every time he would get dizzy thinning beets" (R-101,
Larry Bill Torn), and Plaintiff's hearing \Vhile in Blackfoot in 1963 was bad- .
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Q. During 19:63 while you \Vere up in Blackfoot
and before ~our father had this second injury did you notice anything unusual about
his hearing~
A. Hearing~
Q. Yes, his ability to hear.
A. H-e wasn't hear good.
Q. What~
A. He wasn't hear good.
Q. Now before he was injured in the bull incident
was his-did he have goG-d hearing, Mr. Torn,
as far as y.ou were "ab.le to observe thatf

THE COl~R.T: This \vitness can tell whether or
not he noticed any tendency for hard of hearing, and that's all.
Q. Do you understand the court's state111ent to
you, l\Ir. Tom~
A. Yes, sir.
Q. All right, what -can you tell us about your
father's hearing~
A. He can heur good at that time (R-103, Larry
Bill Tom) (Italics added.)
Plaintiff's disability rendered him unable to work
during the fall and winter of 1962 (R-190)-

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Were you able to work in the fall of 19G~ 'J
No.
Why not~
I was pretty weak at that time. (R-190)

Plaintiff first went to work following the accident
the next summer (R-190) at Blackfoot, Idaho (R-190),
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but suffered the incapacities noted above; he suffer~ J
from dizziness (R-190) and headaches (R-190) and a::;
of the date of trial, spring 1964, still suffered headache~
(R-190); and according to the \Yife his support of the
fan1ily has largely been eliminated.
A.

He tell me he gets dizzy. That is the reason
why he don't hardly vrork, and the boys arr
only been supporting. (R-178, Alice Tom)
POINT I.

THE JURY'S FINDING OF PROXIl\iATE CAUSE WAS
WELL SUPPORTED BY T'HE EVIDENCE.

The direct and proxilnate cause requisite set forth
in -± Ant. Jur., 2d, P. 217, A1nusen1ents and Exhibitions,
Art. 94, cited by Defendant, (Brief, p. 11) \Yas adequately
Inet. The bull caused the melee. It ca1ne to or "right into"
(R-180) the crovvd. The cro\vd surged: p·eople scattered
(R-145 ), stumbled over each other (R-178), cried (R-195),
stood and shouted (R-89), "were scared" (R-195), scrambled to the sides (R-145); the ones in front "re~ally spread
out" (R-145), there was ~a great commotion (R-178),
everyone jumped off (R-180), everyone got up (R-181),
were excited (R-197). We can imagine little less.
In this n1elee Plaintiff fell or as he stated (R-186)
was thrown from the bleacher; and the jury's conclusion

Q.

Did Frank Bill To1n fall from the bleachers
because of the charge of the bull and the
resulting movement of the crowd~

A. "Yes"-was fir1nly and realistically supported. (R-1396)
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I I

POINT II.
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 12 ON DEFENDANT'S DUTY WAS CORRECT.

Instruction K o. 12 reads :
You are further instructed that the defendant was under a duty to see that the fence was
safe for the use for which it was intended, viz., to
keep the bull out of the bleachers and in the arena;
and in that connection you are instructed that it
had a duty to so construct the fence so that it
would serve the purposes for which it \vas intended and to use ·reasonable diligence commensurate
with the risk involved to inspect it from time to
time and see that it was kept in a proper condition to keep the animals in the arena; and if the
defendant failed in either of these duties, it would
he negligent.
This bull was enormous, one ton (R-131) \Yith eighteen-inch horns (R-264), had earlier tried to escape (R131). Rodeo exhibition Brahma bulls are \Vorse than
wild animals; they are trained to be belligerent (R-166),
to fight (R-166), expected to perform (R-167), unpredictable (R-169, vVilliam S. Young), very quick (R-2G6), no
\vay 'vhatsoever to be able to tell what they will do
(R-267); and in this instance the bull 'vas tantalized and
tormented 'vith innertubes and ropes until h<~ 1> ctu:H'
enraged.
Defendant conducted the rodeo. Tll<' proble1n is to
fran1o instruction properly definin<J'
l)c•f('lldant's dut .v
b
'vith respect to containment of sueh trained bulls and this
particular horned behemoth under its mental strain intentionally induced.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
The trial court in Instruction 12 told the jury that
D·efendant's duty was to use reasonable care, coininc~n~ur
ate with the risk involved to construct and keep a safe
fence and to inspect it frorn time to tin1e to see that it
was in proper condition for the use intended.
·The fords "reasonable diligence' 'and "coinnH·nsurate with the risk involved" rnodify and temper the \vhole
p aragraph not just the "inspection" part, and only a
strained construction can net a contrary conclusion.
1

The paragraph, Instruction 1:2, in fairness to the
speaker, must be, not dissected and each con1ponent required to have its modifying adjectiYe adjacent, \vith such
repetition ~a.s that would entail, but read as a \\·hole and
the reasonable import of its I:H:aning gathered fro111
such a re·ading.
Under the facts of the ca~l~, Defendant \\·as fortunate
to enjoy an instruction so liberally worded.
Many if not most jurisdictions and the weight of
authority, if the R.estatemeut indicates the \veight, Restatement of the Law of Torts, Art. 509, as to the keeper
of known dange-rous animals, apply a rule of rather strict
liability, some under negligence theory finding a conclusive p-resumption of negligence (See 69ALR 516, 22 ALR
629, 80 ALR 2d 890), some denying that it is under a negligence theory, but in either event placing the gist of the
action on the keeping with knO\\rledge. H£llntan vs. Garcia, Calif. 283 P.2d 1033; llliller vs. illc/( esson, 73 XY
195; Alexander vs. ·Crockett, :Thiiss. 12± S\V 2d 534; Cougress vs. Edker, 99 US 645, 2± L.Ed. ±87; Hansen cs.
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Kemn~ish,

Io\va 208 NvV 277; ±5 ALR 498; Benkey vs.
Stepp, Okla. 184 P.2d 615; Crowley vs. Groonell, Vt. 50
A 546; Greely vs. Jameson, 1\fass. 164 NE 385 (horse
kno\vn to be a kicker); Chamberlain vs. Lindsey, 1\:Iiss.
139 So. 812. Cases along the same line have been handed
do\vn fron1 Ill., Ky., ~I e., ~I d., Mich., Nebr., Del., N.J.,
·Pa., Tenn., \\Tash., "\Vis., Colo., S.·C., and other jurisdictions. 1rhe reason was stated in Earhart vs. Youngblood,
:27 Pa. 331 to be:
"The public is entitled to act upon the presuinption that all dangerous animals are properly
. d.... "
conf 1ne
Other courts do not make the owner an insurer but
prescribe a high degree of care, placing the grava1nen
·of the action on negligence in not keeping the anin1al
secure, \vhich negligence, however, is presurned fro1n the
•injury. Williams vs. Moray, 74 Ind. 25, 39 Am. R. 76;
excellent discussion in Hayes vs. Smith, Ohio 56 l\I~ 879.
Others apply ordinary negligence rule expressing the
same in terms such as "reasonable diligence coininensurate \\?ith the risk involved" as Instruction 12 contained,
or various equivalent language.
The writer believes Defendant could not have enjoyed a more favorable instruction under
() ~· th ~~
divisions of authority.
California would approve a much ur~lch stronger
instruction than Instruction 12. California Ju; y Instructions, Civil, 3rd Ed., Art. 217, P. 423, gives as a suggested
or approved instruction the follo\ving:
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"Where injury is done by a vicious or otherwise dangerous anin1al, kno\vn to be such by it::;
owner, the owner is liable to the injured person in
'a sum that will compensate hi1n reasonably for all
detriment suffered by him and resulting from thP
injury, unless the injured person kno\vingly and
voluntarily invited the injury and brought it upon
himself. To have done that he voluntarily 1nust
have done something \vith respect to the ani1nal
that induced the injury and \vhich he either knew~
or should have known, was dangerous.
"·This principle of la-\v does not require a
finding that the owner \Vas negligent. The liability attaches to his O\vnership of such an anilnal
\vith knowledge of its dangerous character, and
makes him insurer against injury done by it. Thus,
in applying this rule of la \\T, you are r<~quired,
first, to ask in answer of the question : \\'as the
Plaintiff injured by a vicious or dangerous animal~ If so, two other questions 1nust be answ·ered:
1. Was the animal then o\vned by the defendant
in this action~ 2. Did the owner then have knowledge of the dangerous character of the animal?
"If those questions are ans\vered affirinatively, there is a fourth issue : Did the Plaintiff
knowingly and voluntarily invite the injury and
bring it upon himself~"
·The supplement of the above volume, Page 312,
cites of interest Buff~ngton vs. Nicholson (1947) ~Calif.,
177 P'2d 51, a dog bite case, under California's dog bite
law, where the California court, Page 53, notes:
Since the gist of the tort 'is the keeping of
a thing known to be dangerous, one who keeps
or harbors an animal O\vned by another may be
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liable, if he has such kno,vledge. A bailey with
scienter is, of course, liable.' Prosser on Torts,
Ch. 10, Sec. 57, P. '441.
Utah has enacted such a dog-bite statute, 18-1-1,
.Utah Code Annotated, 1953, that is, a statute 'vhich abolishes scienter and the fact of that enactment may shed
son1e light on \vhat the Utah law is as to the duty of
containment of an animal known to be vicious or dangerous.
As to the known dangerous disposition and potentiality of a Brahma sho\v bull, all experts in the instant case
substantially agreed; the nature of the beast under such
stress \Vas not substantially contradicted, and from the
evidence, reasonable minds could not have differed as to
~uch knowledge on the part of the op·erator. ln that connection, the Texas case, Zuniga vs. Storey, 1951 Texas
239 SW 2d 125, cited by D~efendant in D·efendant's Brief
Page 14, notes, P. 127 :
"Animals subjected to the treatment they
receive in rodeo shovvs become frightened, infuriated, and hence dangerous, and rodeo operators
are charged with knowledge of the fact."
Defendant cites that case, Defendant's Brief, P. 14,
for the proposition:
"While operators of rodeos ... n;:e not l1a~)l(~
as insurers, they are obligated to usc~ rcasonah1<·
care in keeping their shovv anjt.nals ~~'<'Ul\_'ly pPllned and housed so that they \vill not get loose
upon the public street. ... "
That general staternent at the beginning of the
opinion, P. 125, referring to Hshow anilnah;" still does
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not tell us what the law is, even in Texas, "\Vl th respt·et to
an adequate fence. There the bull escaped through a
gate '·'at a time when other gates leading outside \\"t•re
also open," P. 127, and the bull ultimately injured plaintiff two miles away from ·w·here the bull escaped, and the
main question seemed to be on the foreseeability of the
ultimate injury.
In South Dakota as in California a 1nuch stronger
instruction than Instruction K o. 12, 'vould have been
sustained, as indicated in .1inderson rs. Anderson) 1918
South Dakota 168 NW 85·2, a case involving injuries fro1u
a bull of known-dangerous disposition. There the con1t
said, P. 852 :
"It is the theory of the plaintiff as stated in
the first counter complaint that a person kc'eping
a bull or other ani1ual kno\\·n to be of vicious
tendencies is liable for such injuries as may be
caused by such animal, regardless of the degree
of care exercised by such owner in restraining and
controlling such animal or the precautions taken
by the owner of such anin1al to prevent its doing
injury. We believe this contention is supported
by reason and by the weight of authority. The
rule is stated in Congress t~s. Empire, 99 US 659,
25 L.Ed. 487, as follows :
'Whoever keeps an animal accustomed to
attack or injure Inankind, with a kno,vledge
of its dangerous propensities, says Addison,
is p.rima facie liable in an action for damages
at the suit of any person attacked or injure?
by the animal, 'Yithout proof of any neghgence or default in the securing or taking
care of the animal; the gist of the action
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being the keeping of the animal after knowledge of its mischevious disposition. 3 C.J.
88.' "
"But this rule is subject to the following
qualification: If the injured party is guilty of
negligence that co:ntributed directly to the injury,
such negligence would be a defense to the action.
Behunin vs. Moore, Nebraska 15 NW 326.. That
the bull in question in this case had developed a
vicious disposition and was in fact a 'dangerous
animal' prior to and at the time of the injury is
clearly shown by the evidence. The evidence is
sufficient also to charge the defendant,vith knowledge of the vicious tendencies of the bull, if indeed he did not have actual kno,vledge of such
fact. These facts unqualified are sufficient to
establish defendant's liability for the injury.... "
In the l 1 aughn vs. llfiller Bros. case, W. \ 1 a. 153
SE 289, cited by Defendant, Defendant's Brief P. 14, the

court decided only that in an ape-bite case, negligence
in restraint of the ape by the exhibitor must be alleged
in the action for injury, and for failure to so allege the
affidavit for attachment of the circus property before
it could get out of town was quashed. The court pointed

out, Page 290, that "No recovery can be had 'vhere thP
injured party unnecessarily and voluntary puts herself
in the way to be hurt, knowing the probably conS('< {11PJH' .·s
of her act.", and that in West Virginia the "gist of Inodern actions against exhibitors cannot he the

IHPl'P

kt~ep.ing

of savage animals but must be the neglect to restrain
them."
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The Restatement of the Laze of Torts cited else,vhere
with approval by Defendant in its brief, BriPf P. ~0,
gives the law on dangerous domestic ani1nals as follow~:

Art. 509. Except as stated in Art. 317, a
possessor of a domestic animal "" hich he has reason to know has dangerous propensities abnor1nal
to its class is subject to liability for harn1 caused
thereby to others, except trespassors on his land,
although he has exercised the utmost care to
prevent it from ,doing the harn1. (Art. 517 deals
with public officers and common carriers.)
According to 4 Am. J·ur. 'l.d) Animals, Art. 86, P.
334. . . There is no distinction bet,veen the case
of an animal which breaks through the ta1nencss
of its nature and is fiPrce and is kno\vn by its
owners to be so, and one \Yhich is ferae naturaP.
Citing Molloy vs. Starin) X.Y. 83 NE 588; Benky
vs. Stepp, Okla. 184 P.2d 615; Oakes vs. Spaulding, 40 Vermont 347.

4Am. Ju,r. 2d, .Animals, Art. 86, P. 33p reads
If one knowingly keeps a vicious or dangerous
domestic animal and has actual knowledge of its
vicious and dangerous character and that it is
accustome,d to attack and injure people, he 1nay
be held liable for the injuries thus inflicted. In
some jurisdictions, he may be held absolutely
liable if the injured party \vas not himself at fault,
and in others he is at least prima facie liable. The
gist of the action has been characterized as the
keeping of the animal "Tith knowledge of its
VICious disposition or the failure to keep it securely.
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Of interest for historical content espeeially is People vs. SangrenJ 1951 N evv York 98 NE 2d 460, a case
"rhere dogs known to be vicious killed a boy. The case
\Vas prosecuted under New YorkJs Penal Code) Art. 1052,
reading:
"If the owner of a mischievous animal, knowing its propensities, willfully suffers it to go at
large or keeps it "\vithout ordinary care, and the
animal \Vhile so at large and not confined kills
a human being who has taken all the precautions
\vhich the circumstances permitted to avoid the
animal, the owner is guilty of manslaughter in the
second degree."
The court noted, page 465 :
"The reason for this legislative action no
doubt is historical. In _civil cases it has always
been the rule that the liability of an O\vner of a
ferocious animal, whether ferae naturae or domitae, see 28 C.J.S.J Animals, domitae, P. 52, \vhich
attaches for injury done to a third person is absolute where such ani1nal is kept with the O\Vner ,s
kno\vledge of its ferocious propensities, and it is
not shown that the person injured voluntarily or
conciously did anything to bring about the injury
... In such cases no distinction seems to be made
between the two classe of aniinals (Addison on
Torts) 22, 230, ~tth English Ed.), and th(' linbHit:,'
'vhich attaches for any injury done is absolute, unless it can be shown that thP pPrson inj:'rPd voluntarily, or consciously, did sornething to bring
about the injury."
"The gravamen of the crime in the case at
bar is the kUling of a hu1nan being by mischievous
animals which were l:ept without ordinary care
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by their owner who knew of their propensities. It
must be remebered that one of the foundation
stones· of organized society ·- of civilization - is
the safeguards and preservation of hu1nan lifP.
The evil which this particular statute aims to
prevent is the killing of a hu1nan being by a 1nis~
chievous animal. This evil, we 1nay note, has not
only been known to man for countless centuries
hut is one which he long ago recognized and sought
to prevent." Citing Old Testament) Exodus7 Ch.
21, Verses 28 and 29·:
1

"If an ox gore a 1nan or \VOinan that they
die: then the ox shall be surely stoned, and
his flesh shall not be eaten but the owner
shall be quit."
''But if the ox \\TPre \Vont to push \vith
his horn in time past, and it hath been testified to his owner, and he hath not kept him
in, but that he hath killed a man or a \Voman;
the ox shall be stoned, and his owner shall be
put to death."
In Sandy vs. Bushey, 1925 ~Iaine, 128 A. 513, the
court said that where a vicious anin1al \Yhich the o\vner
knows is accustomed to attack and injure mankind is
kept he assumes the obligation of an insurer against
injuries by such animal, .thus following the rule as enunciated in the ~California, New York, South Dakota, and
the restatement excerpts above. l\linnesota in 11 agerty
vs. Radle, 1949, 37 NW 819, enunciated a similar rule,
with respeet to a known vicious stallion \Yhich bit a
child's finger off.
With Robison vs. Robisoll 7 16 Utah 2d P. :2, 394 r·.2d
876, we have no quarrel. This is a dynamite blast case
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{''"tA-r

\Yhere the court, in co1n1nenting on absolute liability, j;eT'
fron1 indicating that the rule 'vas abolished in Utah, declined to apply the rule because of the assu1nption of risk
on t1e part of the injured \\~ho sat astride his horse,
kno\ving the dyna111ite blast 'vas about to occur·; and tht~
c Jurt confir1ned in the footnote, Page 877~~I hat

·doctrine (the rule of absolute liability)
is recognized in Utah, see Madison vs. East Jordan Irrigation Cornpany," 101 Utah 552, 125 P.2d
para. 7H4.
·
Here the jury was told not that the defendants must
n1aintain a bull-proof fence, nor that they were absolutely
liable for anything, nor that they had any absolute duty,
nor that they were an insurer, but that the defendant
should use due diligence to keep a safe fence for the use
intended and to inspect it to ascertain same. 'The language
'vas simple, fair, and proper.
POINT III.
INSTRU,CTIONS GENERALLY WERE CORRECT AND
ADEQUATE.

Defendant's Brief, Points III and IV, P. 16, complains that Instruction 13 unfairly emphasized Plaintiff'~
theory of recovery. In Instruction 13 thP court notP<l
Plaintiff's theory respecting defects in the fence, citing
deficiencies relied upon - it could have cited others,
including lack of eye-high rail fo1· the anirnal to see the instruction ending with language certainly not unfavorable to the Defendant -
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" 'But if in connection \vith these 1natters a:s
you find them to be you believe that defendant
acted as a reasonably prudent person would have
acted under the same or sin1ilar circumstances,
or if you have a reasonable doubt as to \vhethe1·
or not it so acted, then you cannot find that there
was negligence.' "
D~efendant

complains that its theory of defense \Yas
not set forth by instruction; ho\vever, Defendant failed
to request such an instruction (R.-10 to 36), at least \rith
respect to the fence. Defendant's theory as embodied in
the evidence of alcoholic odol" about Plaintiff lying unconscious amongst beer cans and \\~his~=ey bottles, and thJ.·cL~
adult Indians, including Plaintiff, in their forties at the
time of the grand entry, carrying beer packs, is certainly
1nore than generously coverc d in the courfs Instruction
No. 15 with respect to intoxicating liquor.
Defendant's theory as to assun1ption of risk \Vas certainly set forth adequately in Instruction No. 1± on that
subject.
D~efendant's

theory that the bull went through one
part of the fence rather than another could hardly be set
forth by instruction, even if it had been requested, since
one of D·efendant's witnesses, Macey, said the bull went
under, while another defendant's vvitnesses, Whitesides,
said it went over the net wire.
POINT IV.
THE CO·UR!T PRO·PERLY WITHHELD FROM JURY CONSIDERATIO·N CONOEPT'S OF BUSINESS GUEST, LICENSEE, ETC.
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As Defendant con1plains, Defendant's Brief Point
';' p. 18, the jury did escape the travails of a journey
through the jungle of concepts relating to invitees or
business visitors or guests, and licensees or gratuitous
licensees, and the allied concepts of licensor, occupier,
possessor, etc.
j_1rue, Plaintiff paid no ticket but, under the cases,
was still a patron and as such entitled to the degree of
care the court charged; furthermore, he was by express
invitation, D·-193, under the evidence, an invitee, furtherInore, he was, by the undisputed evidence R-185·, R-192,
R-193, R-107, there about defendant's business, i.e., to
participate.
Defendant's Brief cites no cases in point on this
subject and ignores even Hayward vs. Downing, 112
Utah 508, 189 P. 2d 442. There ,plaintiff boys, with
tickets to sit in bleachers at State Fair Grounds Colliseum to watch wrestling matches, sat on a platform
where generally forbidden to sit but with permission,
and platform collapsed, this court ordered a trial, page

446:
" ... Where invitee as to one part of the premises,
receives permission to go upon another part of the
premises in furtherance of the object or purpose8
for which he was originally invited upon the
premises (in this case to vie\v the 'vrestling
matches), he becomes an invitee a~ to such seeond
part of the premises."
The materiality of this case is pointed up when one
keeps in mind, as the court there said, page 445 :
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"The duty of the propri<·tor of a l>ln('<' of
business which is open to public patronagP to U8e
ordinary care to make the prernises safe for ('118tomers is generally limited to that part of tlw
premises designed, adopted, and prepared for the
accommodation of the customers, or to \\"hich customers may reasonably be expected to go."

In Winterowd vs. Christensen, 6S TT+~ ll !'1 1-G •1 ;)1 r.
360, plaintiff, who was injured in a grandstand when
plank broke, had paid a ticket to get into the Lagoon
resort but not into the ballga1ne at the san1e area and,
although the court found that the ballga.me \vas open to
visitors at the resort, the court talked about t1H · indrcen1ent of people into the area, saying, Page 361:
''. . . We think the eirctunstances prl'~·wntPd a
typical case of invitation on the part of the defendant ... "
and the court further said :
"Now with respect to the questions of negligence, it is well settle,d that the owner or occupant of premises who induces other to carne upon
it by invitation, express or inlplied, owes to them
the duty of using reasonably or ordinary care
to keep the premises in a safe and suitable condition so that they will not be unnecessarily or unreasonably exposed to danger." (Italics ours.)
And in Larkin vs. Salt .Air Beach Co1npany, 30 Utah
SG, 83 P. 686, where a baby dro\vned at Salt Air, the
court talked about not whethl\r the particular victin1 had
paid a ticket, although the evidence shovved that tickets
\Ycre purchased, but about whether defendant maintained
a public bathing resort on a lake to \vhich persons in
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general vvere invited to bathe for admission fees charged.
(SeeP. 690, 2nd column.)
In Hahn 'CS. Perkins, N. Carolina, 46 SE 24 85-±,
\rhel·e a boy dro\vned at a public S\vinnning pool tonducted bY defendants for l)l'Ofit it is apparent fro1n the
"
'
opinion that no ticket \Vas paid and the t0st U)Cl.i ·whether
t,tc place was cond~ucted for p·rofit and whether or 1~ot
the victim was a patron, the court saying, P. 856:
"Since the intestate entered the place of recreation conducted by the defendants for profit in
the charter of a patron, he occupied the status
of an invitee." (Italics ours.)
In Parker vs. C1tshman, 195 Fed. 715, 3 N. C.C.A. 92,
22 ALR 629, where a lion seized a girl through the bars
at a wild animal show, the court held plaintiff's failure
to pay a ticket did not relieve defendant from "exercising
a high degree of care for her safety."
1

In the instant case the uncontroverted evidence is
that Plaintiff sought a chance to ride in the rodeo (R-185,
R-192, R-193, R-107) and this is substantiated by Defendant's witness (R-247), "'\vho testified that Plaintiff
sought out the rodeo operator, Robertson (R--2-17). This
circumstance inextricably connected Plaintiff with the
business and profit motives of the Defendant. llo\\·ever,
the writer believes the fact of his being ther<· alone to
\vitness the amusement rendered him a patron nndc 1· the
Hahn vs. Perkins case above.
That Plaintiff was in the place by invitation as well
as in the status of a patron (if not in the character of a
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potential e1nployee and perfor1ner), is undisputed in the
evidence (R-193). A case \Yhere there \\'"as non-pay1nent
but express invitation is Plaskett vs. Benton Warren
Agricultural Society, (Indiana), 89 NE 968, 90 NE 908,
where a t\velve-year-old boy \Vas adn1itted to the fairgrounds without paying an admission fee, although he
should have paid, but where he "·as admitted without
question and just invited in.
Connecticut met the issue squarely in Nordgren vs.
Strong, Connecticut 1930, 149 A. 201, a case of a public
an1usement to which people can1e \\'"ithout paying an adlnittance fee, the operator relying upon rentals, lockers,
refreshments, etc., for his ineoine, the court saying, P.
204---

"All who visit a public resort of the character
of Strong's pavilion are patrons of the proprietor,
\Vhether they have paid the proprietor anything
or not; to all who crune to his resort he owed the
duty of exercising reasonable care."
Clearly, no instruction regarding business visitors or
licensees was necessary or appropriate.
POINT V.
ME'DICAL TESTIMONY O·F DR. HAIGHT WAS PROPERLY RECEIVED.

See Statement of Facts in this brief, P. ----····· Dr.
lfaight's testimony \vas at first excluded b~· the court
(1{-~:~1) then ad1nitted (R-~31), \vhen the court "·as relllindcd ho\\· the san1e \\·as tied in by the testi1nony of
l_.~atT~· l3ill To1n (R-103) and Plse\vhere (R-187, R-188,
R·-~-±2).
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·The causal relationship was abundantly and irrefutably established.
POINT VI.
THE AWARD WAS MO·DEST AND N·OT EXC·ESSIVE.

Please see Statement of Facts in this brief, P. ------·
At the time of the accident Frank Bill T·om was age 38,
in good health, could hear well, could perform his work
well. He suffered a sever skull fracture -vvith brain damage, with permanent-partial disability, permanent hearing impairment, and permanent impairment of working
capacity, to the extent that, according to the wife, the
children must now be depended upon for support (R179).
The verdict was modest, only.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's duty was properly and fairly stated;
the jury's finding of breach of that duty and of proximate cause was abundantly supported by the evidence;
defendant was fully protected by the instructions; medical
evidence rulings were proper ; damages weTe modest; and
the jury verdict should be upheld.
Respectfully submitted,

GAYL,E, D·E,AN HUNIT'
Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake 'City, Utah
and

D:WIGHT' L. KING
2121 South State Street
Salt Lake 'City, Utah

Attorneys for P'laintiffR.espondent
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